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SOME NEW ASPECTS OF THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY
JURY.
THE two features of the subject of jury trial which are most
often in the public mind are, first, the tenacity with which the peo-
ple adhere to the system, and, second, the growing dissatisfaction
with it, which is perceived among educated men and in the legal
profession. Without exception this mode of trial is preserved in
the judicial system of the several states; all of them giving assur-
ance of it as a right in criminal cases, and two-thirds of them by
their constitutions depriving fhe legislatures of the power to take
from litigants the privilege in civil cases. Moreover, almost without
exception, it is the historical jury that is retained; the jury of twelve
men, who must return a unanimous verdict, and to whose judgment
the facts are referred for final determination. The recent efforts
in the line of constitution-making will show clearly the general drift
of public action, which is all in one direction. Texas and Ala-
bama provide that "the right of trial by jury shall remain invio-
late ;" Pennsylvania that "trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and
the right thereof remain inviolable." Missouri and Nebraska
make similar provision, except that they permit trials in the infe-
rior courts by a less number than twelve. Colorado preserves the
*right "inviolate" in criminal cases, but in civil cases and cases of
minor offences, permits the number to be less than twelve. Thus
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the traditions and practice of immemorial timeg axe adhered to on
all sides, and the modifications permitted are immaterial. Nor have
the people been content to leave the subject with the law-making
authority, but they have assumed the right to be one of the essen-
tials of good government; something not to be improved upon, tam-
pered with or put aside under any circumstances, and have treated
it as a part of the due process of law which was and for ever was to
be the sacred right of the citizen. We take no notice here of pro-
visions for the waiver of the right, as these are not important to
anything which follows.
In several of the states the legislature has gone beyond the con-
stitution in giving importance to the jury by diminishing the func:
tions of the judge; taking from him entirely the right of assisting
and guiding the action of the jury in sifting and weighinig evidence,
which was an important part of his duty at the common law. The
judge is required in these states to confine his charge strictly to a
written presentation of the law, and is inhibited from commenting
on the facts. It does not seem to have occurred to any one to raise
the question whether in preserving the historical right of jury trial
the constitution had not guaranteed the functions of the judge as
well as those of the jury; and whether it was admissible to change
the system radically in one particular any more than in another;
but some of the changes made are unquestionably very great. In
some states, the same jury that passes upon the facts of an alleged
crime, also assesses the punishment, and curious results are some-
times worked out which the judge must accept and act upon, how-
ever erroneous or -absurd they may appear to him. It is surely a
matter of some importance to know whether the judge may be made
a cipher in this time-honored tribunal, and whether the agreement
of twelve men in a certain conclusion on the facts, however accom-
plished, is all the constitution aims at. The recent changes in the
method of selecting the jury, whereby the prisoner's peremptory
challenges have been diminished in number, or those of the govern-
ment increased, or the grounds of challenge modified, have all been
,defended and sustained on the ground that they were not changes
in the mode of trial, but only such modifications in the method of
selecting the impartial tribunal which the jury is supposed to be,
as experience had shown were important to preserve the right in
its constitutional integrity: Walston v. Commonwealth, 16 B. Mon.
15; Warren v. Commonwealth, 87 Penna. St. 45; Walter v.
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People, 32 N. Y. 147; State v. Ryan, 13 Minn. 370; State v.
Wilson, 48 N. 11. 398; Commonwealth v. -Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412;
-Dowling v. tate, 5 S. & M. 664; Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164.
Modifications of that sort must always be admissible; they are in
harmony with the system, not radical changes of it.
But while from generation to generation we have been repeating
the guaranties of the institution, embarrassments have been spring-
ing up in the actual administration of it, some of which are new
because the circumstances from which they grow are new, and some
perhaps are due to the gradual operation of judicial decisions in a
wrong direction. Among these is the increased difficulty of making
up the panel from intelligent men, arising from over-strictness on
the part of judges in rejecting all whose minds have in any way
been influenced by what they may have heard or seen published on
the subject which they are to investigate. The theory of jury trial
implies that'the tribunal is always to be composed of men wholly
unbiased and indifferent between the parties; and Chief Justice
MARSHALL very justly ruled in Burr's ease that the existence of
"strong and deep impressions, which will close the mind against
the testimony that may be -offered in opposition to them-which
may combat the testimony and resist its force," was reason suffi-
cient for excluding a person from the panel. But, on the other hand,
this eminent judge did not undertake to require for jurors in his
court persons whose minds were a blank, and wholly unimpressed
by anything they may have heard or read concerning the case to be
tried. If assertions are made in the community as facts, either in
common discourse or in the papers, some impression is likely to be
produced upon the mind by them; but if the impression does not
become settled belief, there is no reason why it should constitute a
disqualification in the case of a man disposed to regard the evidence.
It is not to be supposed that such impressions will close the mind
against a fair consideration of the testimony; and in the absence
of further proof of bias, the juror should be accepted : 1 Burr's
Trial 416. The intelligent observance of this distinction would
tend to keep tle tribunal both impartial and respectable; but it
must be conceded that in some of the states the rules for securing
impartial jurors had been so far perverted as to bring serious dis-
credit upon the administration of justice, and sometimes to present
the "intelligent juror" to the public as an object of derision. New
York, in the action of some of its inferior tribunals, was particularly
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unfortunate in this regard; and the city of New York being the
chief business centre of the country, the doings of whose tribunals
would have general interest everywhere, the impanelling of jurors
there attracted general notice. The public journals heaped ridicule
upon the jury as a body carefully sifted of intelligent men; and
the impression found its way into the public mind that in contem-
plation of law a man sufficiently intelligent to read the current
news was presumptively disqualified, by having read of current
events, from having a place on the jury. This was a great evil,
something of which has been corrected by legislation, and more,
perhaps, by a more careful attention on the part of courts to the
reasons for exclusion: Osiander's Case, 3 Leigh 785; Mann v.
Glover, 14 N. J. 195; State v. Potter, 18 Conn. 174; Smith v.
-anes, 3 Ill. 78; Holt v. People, 13 Mich. 224; Bradford v.
State, 15 Ind. 347; Scranton v. Stewart, 52 Id. 68 ; State v.
Phair, 48 Verm. 866 ; Black v. State, 42 Texas 377 ; O'Mara v.
Commonwealth, 75 Penna. St. 424; Ortwein v. Commonwealth,
76 Id. 414; Elbin v. Wilson, 33 Md. 135; Union Gold Mining
Co. v. National Bank, 2 Col. 565. A more serious embarrassment
springs from the fact that in large classes of cases it has come to be
generally accepted by the public as a fact the jurbrs will be influ-
enced in their verdicti by considerations which have no proper
place in their deliberations; and these considerations are calcu-
lated upon, and juries demanded in view of their existence when
otherwise they would be waived.. Special reference is here made
to all those cases which afford an opportunity for an appeal* to the
sympathies in favor of one party against the other party; but more
especially to those cases in which corporations are parties defendant.
Confining our attention now exclusively to this last class of cases,
we only mention a notorious fact when we state that in suits with
corporations, especially when the question involved is one of per-
sonal injury or injury to property, the liability for which is charged
upon the corporation, -the counsel for the defence generally goes
into the case with the conviction that he must address a prejudiced
tribunal, whose members are likely to look upon themselves as the
representatives of the people, sitting to award. justice to one of
their own number against a member of an obnoxious privileged
class. The fact of probable bias is so notorious that no one ever
questions it, or fails, as far as may be practicable, to govern his con-
duct by it, if his interests require him to do. sb. The mischiefs
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resulting from this are infinite. Among them we may mention the
following:-
1. A general distrust of the tribunal established by law for the
trial of facts.
2. The growth of an apparent antagonism between the judge and
the jury in these cases; the judge, if he obeys fearlessly the dictates
of duty, being frequently compelled to interfere, and to set aside ver-
dicts which in his view have no better foundation than the prejudices
or the sympathies of the jurors. Cases against railroad companies
furnish numerous illustrations of the necessity for such interference;
verdicts being frequently set aside as having no evidence whatever
to support them.
3. The undermining of the confidence of the community in the
judges themselves. This may happen from several causes.
(a) If the judges endeavor faithfully to give to corporate rights
the same protection which is given to individuals, the community
from which jurors are chosen, and whose members will be likely to
sympathize in the views and feelings of the jury, may come to look
upon the judges as the champions and defenders of monopoly and
oppression, and to distrust them accordingly.
(b) The judges themselves, if they believe they are aciing in the
correction of prejudiced and unfair conduct on the part of jurors,
are liable unconsciously to go to the other extreme, and to invade
the province of the jury by setting aside -verdicts as unwarranted,
when in truth the facts in evidence fairly presented a case for
the jury to pass upon and from which a conclusion either way was
admissible. "
(c) The same considerations which influence the counsel to
demand a jury in preference to the submission of his case to the
court may sometimes tempt him during the trial to play the part
so impudently played by Dr. Kenealy in the Tick borne case, and
by such artifices as the case affords opportunity for, to endeavor to
impress the jury with an idea of unfairness and partiality on the
part of the judge, thereby preparing them to receive with distrust
and suspicion all his rulings, and encouraging them to nullify in
-their own action the efforts of the judge to do justice to an unpopular
party. The counsel who after an adverse ruling by the judge said to
the jury, "Gentlemen, you stick by me and I'1l stick br you, and*
we'll beat the court yet," was only one of a class, though few who
adopt his policy so plainly and publicly announce their reliance.
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And who will respect either the court or the bar if thus they
publicly show that they do not respect each other ?
(d) An elective judiciary is also exposed to the suspicion of
yielding to popular sentiments and prejudices in the same cases in
which jurors are likely to be improperly swayed.' Their positions
are conferred by the public voice and held at the popular will; arid
the judge who, while honestly administering the law, endeavors
faithfully to maintain the privileges and prerogatives of the jury,
may be suspected of courting popularity at the expense of unpopular
litigants. In this way the American method of selecting judges is
brought into disrepute, and the confidence of the people in their legal
tribunals is further wekkened, without presenting any reasonable
prospect that the distrust which is cultivated can lead to any change
in the method in which judges are chosen.
These matters are manifestly very serious, and the mere mention
of them is sufficient to bring to the mind something of the difference
in jury trial as it exists in some of the American states, under
judges stripped in great measure of their common-law power of
control, and jury trial as it has been preserved in Great Britain,
with juries held by the judge in strict subordination to the law.
The system may still deserve our respect and attachment, but we
must take it as it is to- us and not as it was to our ancestors.
We think also that the disputed border line between the cases in
which parties are and those in which they are not entitled to jury
trial, has oflate been growing more and more indistinct and doubt-
ful. There are cases as to which the courts have never been able to
agree whether they ranged themselves on one side or the other of
the division line. Cases involving the right to a public or corporate
office are of this description. Where the constitution is silenit re-
garding the method of trying this right, the different states have
made different provisions, some naming an administrative body to
which disputed elections should be referred, some providing for
jury trial, and some leaving such cases to be determined according
to the rules of the common law. . In the cases last mentioned it is
generally assumed that jury trial is matter of constitutional right.
It has been so held in Alabama, New York and Louisiana: State
v. Burnett, 2 Ala. 140; People v. Albany, &e., Railroad Co., 57
N. Y. 361 ; State v. Hfead, 22 La. Ann. 54 ; and a like opinion has
been intimated in Michigan without authoritative decision: People
v. Ciott, 16 Mich. 283, 309, per CIUnISTIANCY, J. See-People v.
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Doesburg, 16 Mich. 133. But in Pennsylvania this conclusion is
disputed. The court in the opinion place much stress upon a long
practical construction of the constitution, but advancing beyond
this they 'assert the principle that "it is not in the act of organiza-
tion of the state, nor in the perpetuation of its organic succession,
but in the administration of rights under the organization, that the
constitution secures the right of trial by jury. The jury is the
popular element in the determination of rights which need enforce-
ment by means of the state organization; but there is a much
larger popular element in our elections, the votes of all our people;
and all our political practice shows that we have not considered the
jury an essential means of deciding contested elections of public
officers. We see nothing but inexpediency to prevent the legisla-
ture from declaring that the process of election should end with the
general return, and that that should be conclusive evidence of the
title to office or commission. But they have wisely chosen not to
do so, and have appointed the court to finish the process, if the-
general return be contested, by a proper review of the work of the
election officers. And as they have not required that the court
should have the aid of a jury for this part of the process, any more
than for any previous part, no such aid can be demanded of right
by either party, nor is allowable:" Ewing v. Tilley, 43 Penna. St.
384, 390, per LowRfE, 0. J. See Commonwealth v. Baxter, 35
Id. 263.
The same learned court has nevertheless held that when the
question is one of the forfeiture of an office into which the claimant
has been inducted, jury trial is of right. When he has once been
vested with the office, he has been clothed with a'right, and this
cannot be taken fi'om him on the ground of forfeiture, except upon
a "legal proceeding before a competent court, where the party has
his day in court, and a due jury trial according to the course of the
common law:" Commonwealth v. Allen, 70 Penna. St. 465, 472.
The office in question was that of councilman in the city of Phila-
delphia. (Compare Commonwealth v. Leech, 44 Penna. St. 332;
State v. Johnson, 26 Ark. 281; Wammack v. Holloway, 2 Ala.
31.) This distinction between a claim to an office and a right in an
.office has not been made prominent in other states. There can be
no doubt, we suppose, that a dispute concerning an office presents
a case at law; the courts of equity having always refused to inter-
fere in election cases-disclaiming all right to do so: Mozeley v.
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Alston, 1 Phil. Ch. 790; Tappdn v. Gray, 9 Paige 506; Mickles
v. BoCke8ter City Bank, 11 Id. 118; Hartt v. Harvey, 32 Barb.
55; _Dorenus v. -Dutch Church, 2 Green (N. J.) Ch. 332: Uyde-
graff v. Crans, 47 Penna. St. 103; -Dickey v. Beed, 78 Ill. 261,
and cases cited.
In equity cases properly so called, it is well settled that a jury is
not a matter of right, though in its discretion the court may cause
issues to be framed for trial by jury, or direct a suit to be brought
at law.' In a few of the states contested facts are triable by jury
either by the provisions of their constitution as construed by the
courts or pursuant to express statutory provisions.
2
For convenience of reference, a few of the cases on the subject are referred to;
these being but a small portion of the *hole number : Dale v. Roosevelt, 6 Johns.
Ch. 255; Coliev. Tiffl, 47 N. Y. 119 ; Brinkley Y. Brinkley, 56 Id. 192; Farmers',
4-c., Bank v. Joslyn, 37 Id. 353; Baker v. Williamson, 2 Penna. St. 116 ; Scheetz's
Appeal, 35 Id. 88; Phillips's Appeal, 68 Id. 130; Ward v. Kill, 4 Gray 593;
.Crittenden Y. Field, 8 Id. 626 ; Black v. Lamb, 12 N. J. Eq. 113; Uildreth v. Schil-
lenger, 10 Id. 196; Trenton Banking Co. v. Woodruff, 2 Id. 117; Nice v. Purcell,
1 Hen. & -M. 372 ; Marshall v. Thompson, 2 Munf. 412 ; Grigsby v. Weaver, 5
Leigh 197 ; Isler v. Grove, 8 Gratt. 257 ; Fornshill v. Murray, 1 Bland 479 ;
Williamson v. Mlontgomery, 40 Md. 373; Waters v. Comly, 3 Harr. 117; Lea v.
BIeatty, 8 Dana 207 ; Kernsely v. Kennedy, 2 Ala. 571 ; Atwood T. Smith, 11 Id.
894 ; McGowen v. Jones, R. M. Charl. 184 ; iler v. Roath, 4 Miss. 276; Fry v.
Ford, 8 Rich. Eq. 349; Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 180; Randolph v. Adams, 2 W.
Va. 519 ; Carlisle v. Foster, 10 Ohio N. S. 198; Cahoon v. L.vy, 5 Cal. 294;
Morris v. Morris, 28 Mo. 114; Well v. flume, 49 Id. 158; White v. Hampton, 10
Iowa 238 ; State v. Orwig, 25 Id. 280; Ray v. Doughty, 4 Blackf. 115; Lapreese
v. Falls, 7 Ind. 692; Russell v. Paine, 45 Ill. 350; Dowden v. Wilson, 71 Id.
485; Lake v. Tolles, 8 Nev. 285 ; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148; Harding v.
Hardng, 11 Wheat. 103.
2 The provision in the New Hampshire constitution which has been held to give
the right was as follows: "In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits
between two or more persons, except in cases where it has been heretofore used
and practised, the parties have a right to a trial by jury ; and this method of pro-
cedure shall be held sacred, unless in.cases arising on the high seas, and such as
relate to mariners' wages, the legislature shall think it necessary hereafter to alter
it." In Uarston v. Brackett, 9 N. H. 336, 349, the bill was filed to set aside a
mortgage f6r fraud, and the court say, " Upon the motion for a trial by jury we
are of the opinion that a defendant in chancery has a right by the constitution to
have matters of fact alleged in the bill and denied by the answer tried by a jury,
if they are material to the decision of the cause and the application is seasonably
made." And see Hoitt v. Burleigh, 18 N. H. 389. The constitution of Texas
gives the right to a jury trial in equity cases in very explicit terms. See Faulk v.
Faulk, 23 Texas 653. As to North Carolina, see Taylor v. Person, 1 Hawks 298;
Andrews v. Prichett, 66 N. C. 387. In Georgia all questions of fact in equity cases
are sent to a jury; Mounce v. Byars, 11 Geo. 180 ; McDougaldv. Dougherty, 11 Id.
570; Brown v. Burke, 22 Id. 574.
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To those accustomed to a distinct law and equity jurisdiction some
confusion is necessarily brought by the doing away of all distinctions,
not only in the forum, but in the forms of procedure. But as matters
of constitutional right cannot depend upon forms of legislative pre-
scription, it is clear that wherever the ancient trial by jury is pre-
served, it must exist in the cases in which it was formerly allowable;
and if these were classified according to the old distinctions between
legal and equitable jurisdiction, the distinctions themselves must
determine the right. It thus continues as necessary as ever to
keep the distinctions in view. This is made plain by the decisions
in Pennsylvania; the nature of the right in dispute and the relief
sought being referred to as tests of the right to jury trial, and not
any form of proceeding. An ejeetment cannot be tried in equity
upon bill and without a jury, by merely giving it the semblance 6f an
equity suit, and praying to have the adverse claimant enjoined from
denying or resisting the complainant's claim and the exercise there-
of.' Boundary disputes are not to be transferred to equity through a
mere assumption of equitable forms, unless some equity is superin-
duced by the acts of the parties: Norris's Appeal, 64 Penna. St.
275; Tilimes v. Marsh, 67 Id. 507.
In the cases referred to in the note, and in the still more recent
1 "' Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolable.'
What can this mean but that the right of having controverted questions of fact in
common-law cases decided by a jury should be beyond the reach of any department
of the government, whether it be the legislative, the executive or the judiciary I
This was the right which had always been enjoyed before, and if the constitutional
provisions were not intended to protect that in all its length and breadth, they can
mean nothing. It is true the legislature are authorized to vest in the courts such
powers beyond those enumerated, to grant relief in equity, as shall be found neces-
sary (art. 5, 1 6), but this must be understood as referring to powers in equity cases ;
in that class of cases of which chancery had jurisdiction. Such an understanding
is necessary to make the different parts of the constitution consistent with each
other, and to give effect to all. It cannot mean that the legislature may confer
upon the Supreme Court and the Courts of Common Pleas, the power of trying,
according to the Courts of Chancery, any question which has always been triable
according to the course of law by a jury. If it can, then an.ejectment founded
solely on legal title, an action of debt on bond, or a replevin, or an action of
trespass, may be sent into chancery, all contested facts in it be decided by the
.judge, and the intervention of a jury be unknown. Then what has become of the
constitutional right of the citizen ? Such a doctrine would startle the people of this
Commonwealth, and justly, for it would deprive them of one of their most valued
privileges." STRONo, J., in North Penna. Coal Co. v. Snowden, 42 Peuna. St.
488, 492.
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case of H7aines's Appeal, 73 Penna. St. 169 (and see Haines v.
Levin, 51 Id. 412), the authority of the legislature to give to a tri-
bunal acting without'a jury the power to determine legal rights
where no equitable ground of relief appears, is most emphatically
denied. In Michigan the same rule has been declared in a case
where by statute it was attempted to substitute a bill in equity for
an action of ejectment: Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322. A like
general rule is declared in North Carolina: Andrews v. _Priclwtt,
66 N. C. 387. In New Hampshire it is held that proededings to
assess damages for the taking of property for the public use need
not be by jury, because they were not so when the constitution was
adopted: Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H." 19 (see Coeheco Co. v.
Strafford, 51 Id. 455); but in Indiana they must be because that
was the previous mode: Lake 1Erie, ft., _ailroad Co. v. Heath,
9 Ind. 558. In Wisconsin, the legal and the equitable causes of
action upon a mortgage and the obligation which it secures may be
united, because such was the practice before the adoption of the
constitution, in that state as well as others: Stilwell v. Kellogg,
14 Wis. 461. And in the same state there may be a compulsory
reference of a case involving long accounts, though one issue in the
case is upon the question of the release and. discharge of the defend-
ants upon an official bond: Supervisors of -Dane v. Dunning, 20
Wis. 210 (compare King v. Hopkins, 57 N. H. 334). In Ohio, it
is held that a party charged under the statute in probate proceedings
with concealing or embezzling the effects of the deceased, cannot,
if he disputes the charge, have judgment rendered against him
without jury trial: Howell v. Fry, 19 Ohio N. S. 556. But in
the same state, though the plaintiff's cause of action may be triable
by jury, this fact will not prevent an" equitable cause of action, set
up by answer, from being tried by the court, nor preclude the court
from disposing by its decree of the whole merits of the controversy:
Buckner v. Mear, 26 Ohio N. S. 514.
The right of jury trial cannot be indirectly taken away, by en-
larging the jurisdiction of inferior courts which proceed without
jury: Thomas v. Bibb, 44 Ala.. 721 (compare Guile v. Brown,
38 Conn. 237). In divorce cases, whatever may be the forum or
the forms of proceeding, a jury is not a matter of constitutional
right unless given by the constitution in express terms: Leffel v.
Leffel, 35 Ind. 76; Bigelow v. Bigelow, 120 Mass. 320.
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The case of receiverships is deserving of special attention in this
connection. A receiver is an officer of the court, usually appointed
for some temporary purpose, such as to take possession of partner-
ship or corporate property, or of a disputed fund, and hold the same
while the equities of claimants are being adjusted. To preserve
the property and keep its value unimpaired, it may sometimes be
necessary to keep an existing business in operation pending the
adjustment of rights; and in partnership and some other cases, this
may be the only method of preserving the good-will of a business
which has become valuable. Meantime the possession of the pro-
perty by the receiver is regarded as the possession of the court which
has appointed him; he retains, manages and protects it that the
court may in due time make the proper disposition of it; and the
court will not suffer this possession to be disturbed without its per-
mission: Peale v. Phipps, 14 How. 868; In re Colvin, 3 ALd. Ch.
Dec. 278 ; lliceott v. Warford, 4 Md. 80; Field v. Jones, 11
Geo. 413 ; De Groot v. Jay, 80 Barb. 488 ; Ohio, &c., _ailroad Co.
v. Davis, 28 Ind. 558.
Lord ELDON warned a solicitor that he would proceed against the
receiver in an ejectment suit, without the leave of the court, at his
peril: Angelv. Smith, 9 Yes. 885. See Beverley v. Brooke, 4 Gratt.
211.1 And some cases have gone so far as to say that it is a con-
tempt of court to bring suit against a receiver for the property in
his custody, or for anything done by him as receiver, without leave
obtained: Taylor v. Baldwin, 14. Abb. Pr. 166. (See Biggs v.
Whitney, 15 Id. 388; -DeGroot v. Jay, 80 Barb. 488; _1Miller v.
Lock, 64 Id. 484; O'-lfahoney/v. Belmont, 62 N. Y. 188; Beverley
v. Brooke, 4 Gratt. 211; Tompson v. Scott (U. S. Circuit Court,
Iowa), 3 Central Law Journal 737.)
This doctrine strikes us as unnecessary to the receiver's pro-
tection, and unsound. Of course if suit has been enjoined, there
is a clear contempt of court in bringing it, but if not enjoined, we
should say that no one was bound to take notice of the official char-
acter of the receiver in bringing suit against him. It is enough that
he has a cause of action against the individual; and if the defend-
ant desires the protection of the court which has appointed him, he
must apply for it. The failure to obtain leave to sue in a court of
I A suit brought without leave would be enjoined on application of the receiver:
Vermont 4 Canada Railroad Co. v. Vermont Central Railroad Co., 46 Vt. 792;
High on Receivers, 140, 256, and cases cited.
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law could, we should suppose, be no defence in that court; still less
could it be a contempt of the Court of Chancery. The doctrine is
clearly and, it seems to us, correctly laid down in Blumenthal v.
Brainerd, 38 Verm. 403, 407, where it is held that while
the Court of Chancery will protect a person acting under its pro-
cess or authority against suits at law, and will compel parties to
apply to that court for relief, yet that this protection is accorded by
the court to its officers only on their own application, and is granted
as a matter of discretion. The plaintiff is under no obligation to
assume that the protection will be applied for, or that if applied for
it will be accorded. The like doctrine is declared by the Supreme
Court of Iowa in Allen v. Central Railroad Co., Western Jurist
for June 1876, 3 Central Law Journal 484. (And see Vermont &
Canada Railroad Co. v. Vermont Central Railroad Co., 46 Verm.
792, 799.) Leave is given in suitable cases when application
therefor is made,1 but the judgment when obtained -is allowed
to charge the defendant in his representative capacity only, not
personally: Meara'8 Adm. v. Holbrook, 20 Ohio N. S. 137;
Cardot v. Barney, 63 N. Y. 281; Camp v. Barney, 6 T. C.
(N. Y. S. C.) 622, s. c.. 4 Hun 873; Davenport v. Beceivers,
fc., 2 Woods 519. (See Commonwealth v. Bunk, 26 Penna.
St. 235; Kein v. Jewett, 26 N. J. Eq. 474.) It is obvious
that if leave must be asked for it may be refused as well as
granted: Henderson v.. Walker, 55 Geo. 481 ;' and it may follow
that in the innumerable cases in which disputes will arise con-
cerning the right to property in the receiver's hands, or in which
personal injuries may be sustained through the management of the
business by the receiver, the party claiming to be injured by the
receiver's act or default will be without any remedy whatever accord-
ing to the course of the common law, unless the Court of Chancery
in its discretion shall see fit to accord it. Whether actions could
of right be brought against the receiver upon contracts made by
him as such is perhaps not so clear, though it is assumed in a lead-
ing case that even such an action would be one that the Court of
I As in Afeara's Adm'r v. Iolbrook, 20 Ohio N. S. 137. This was a statutory
action, allowed to be brought against the receiver of a railroad company for the
negligent killing of tac plaintiff's intestate through the negligence of the receiver's
servant. And see Ames v. Trustees, 4c., 20 Bear. 332; Noe v. Gibson, 7 Paige
513; S inner v. Maxwell, 68 N. C. 400.
2 Leave has often been denied. See 3 Central Law Journal 427.
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Chancery might in its discretion restrain: Blumenthal v. Brainerd,
88 Verm. 403.'
In order that we may appreciate how extensively the doctrines
referred to may encroach on the constitutional right of trial by
jury, it is only necessary to call attention to the fact that at this
time several of the most important railroad Jines in the country
are in the hands of receivers. Numerous short lines are also in the
same condition, anui in some of the states it would almost seem that
the chief business of the Federal courts had come to be the super-
vision and 3ianagement of railways. The state courts also have
some part in the same business. Nor have the roads been placed
,by the courts in the hands of receivers for any of the temporary
purposes for which receivers are usually appointed ; they have been
placed there in many cases for permanent management and opera-
tion. The receivership is not a matter ancillary to the settlement
of rights and adjustment of equitie. in a pending suit, but the suit
is brought and lefftpending as a necessary proceeding in transferring
the.management of a road to new hands, and the suit bdcomes an
incident to the receivership, not the receivership to the suit. At
this time the larger portion of all the railroads in the country are
in condition which would justify -the Court of Chancery, in accord-
ance with its precedents, in placing them in the hands of receivers;
for they are defaulters on their bonds, and presumptively the inte-
rests of the creditors are superior to those of the stockholders, as
certainly their equities are. It is therefore apparent that the ques-
tion whether these roads shall pass into the hands of receivers, is
only a question of what, in the minds of creditors, is most likely to
protect and advance their interests ; according to the rules governing
equity jurisdiction they are entitled to receivers if they apply for
them; and if in their opinion the advantages of that course will more
than countervail the disadvantages, the demand for the appoint-
ment is likely to be made.
Nbw it is an advantage of a very startling and important charac-
acter if, by submitting a road and its workings to the control of a
court of chancery, and putting it in possession of an appointee of
that court, selected by those principally interested in the road, the
I In this case suit against the receiver of a railroad on a contract for the carriage
of property, was sustained ; no application having been made to the Court of
Chancery to stay it. And see .Paige v. Smith, 99 Mass. 395. Of course a receiver
can be called to account only in the court by which he was appointed: Conking v.
Eul er, 4 Bissell 22.
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right to jury trial for all the numerous wrongs afid injuries, real or
pretended, which may arise or be alleged in the conduct and man-
agement of railway business, can be superseded, or at least put
under the restraint of the Court of Chancery. The advantage is
too great to be overlooked when the question of a receivership is
under considtration; and we are perfectly safe in saying that it
cannot fail in many cases to have a controlling, influence. Why
should the parties interested in a railway consent that a tribunal
which they assume will generally be prejudiced agains them, may
pass upon the claims asserted against them, or their trustee, arising
out of the management of their property, when it is entirely in their
power to transfer all controversies to a tribunal which in their minds
is subject to no such suspicions? Especially when, according
to the common belief of persons interested in railroad property, a
large proportion of the claims made will be unfounded, and in the
case of others a prejudiced tribunal would have the power and would
be likely to exercise it, of awarding excessive damages ?
The ancient province of jury trial is, therefore, encroached upon
largely, not only through the vast increase in the number and im-
portance of -the cases of receiverships, but also through the giving
of a permanent character to an office usually temporary. It may
also be questioned whether the extent of the protection accorded to
receivers has not insensibly been enlarged so as to embrace cases
not within the original intent. It is obviously one thing to protect
the possession of the receiver and enjoin suits for the property in
his hands, and quite a different thing to shield him against the con-
sequences of his own trespasses, negligences, or refusals to observe
his contracts. .The questionable nature of the protection is pre-
sented in a very striking light when the complaint is one of personal
fault on the part of the receiver himself, and not of technical respon-
sibility for the fault of others. Conceding that the receiver's pos-
'session is not to be disturbed or endangered without the leave of
the court, and that the doctrine respondeat superior ought not to be
applied to him as a ground of personal liability where personal
fault is not imputed, does it follow that where personally he is in
fault, and a common-law right of action for this fault has arisen, the
Court of Chancery can, consistent with any acknowledged principle
of constitutional right, plant itself before its receiver, and preclude
the party injured from having his case heard in the usual way? If
one knowingly puts an incompetent servant in possession of his car-
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riage and I am run over in consequence, of what importance can it
be in a legal or constitutional point of view that lie holds the car-
riage in some fiduciary capacity, and not as owner or hirer? We
barely allude to this question here, as one that hitherto has been
passed over sub silcntio, but which ought, one -would suppose, to
receive careful and thorough consideration if jury trial is to be pre-
served. It is not a desirable feature in any legal system, that of
two persons injured alike and under like circumstances, one should
be entitled to a popular remedy, sanctioned by time and solemnly
guarantied by the constitution, while the other is left to petition
for redress to a judge who will grant or refuse it in his discretion.1
But it is not alone that civil rights of action are taken from jury
cognisance by means of receiverships. The Courts of Chancery
are enabled to, and do, tak6 notice of some offences against the
general laws, anl punish them. A riot on the New York Central
Railroad which iiterferes with the running of its trains- is only a
riot ; but on the Erie Railroad it is a contempt of the Court of
Chancery. In the one case only a jury can deal with it, and twelve
men must agree concerning its legal bearings; in the other a single
judge may administer summary punishment. This may be a use-
ful power, but it is an enormous power, and it is not surrounded by
the usual securities which protect individual liberty; and we may
be reasonably certain that its frequent exercise will lead to new con-
sideration of the logical foundlations of jury trial, and perhaps also
of the limitations to the power to punish as judicial contempts acts
not committed in the presence of the court. Rights and protections
I In State v. V'ermont Central Railroad Co., 30 Vt. 108, it is held that a railroad
company is not liable to indictment for a nuisance in the obstruction of a highway
by trains while the road is operated by a receiver; but it is assumed that the receiver
would be liable. In Ohio 4. Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Ftch, 20 Ind. 498, a rail-
road company was held responsible in a suit to recover value of cattle killed by its
machinery, though the road was then operated by a receiver. Sprague v. Smith,
29 Vt. 421, and Lampheaev. .Buckingham, 33 Conn. 237, were cases of suits against
trustees of bondholders operating railroads, and who were held liable as owners,
but the position of these trustees under mortgage is obviously quite distinct from
that of receivers. In Meara's Adm'r v. Holbrook, 20 Ohio N. S. 137, the receiver
was not charged with personal negligence. In Cardot v. Barney, 63 N. Y.
281, the action for causing the death of plaifitiffs testator was held not
maintainable. Defendant was assignee in bankruptcy of a railroad, and stress
is laid upon the fact that the negligence complained of was not his own, but
that of servants whose assistace he must necessarily havo had in the discharge
of his official trust.
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ought to be the same everywhere; the property which the receiver
manages for its owners -is no more sacred than that which the owners
manage in person; it ought to have the same protection and no
more.
It has not been our purpose in this paper to call in question the
correctness of any recent judicial action, but rather t6 direct atten-
tion to some very noticeable and important facts. One of the most
remarkable of these is, and one deserving of special attention and
reflection, that since the late riots great gratification has been ex-
pressed in various publications, that the courts were enabled in
certain cases to bring the rioters summarily before them and to
inflict speedy and effectual punishment without delay or the oppor-
tunity to appeal to a-popular tribunal. This gratification 'has had
no regard to the fact that the property was peculiarly situated; that
was only a circumstance which was thought fortunately to afford the
opportunity for the summary remedy; and the latter has been
treated as a thing good in itself. Now the power of the courts to
punish for contempts is exceedingly vague and indeterminate; its'
limits are uncertain; the constitutional protections which surround
jury trial do not apply to it, and'it is subject to few statutory regu-
lations ; for the most part the power is in the breast of a single
judge without fixed rule or landmark limiting his discretion. But
manifestly if a discretionary authority like this is good and useful
in some cases it is good in all other similar cases; and its exercise
ought not to depend on a circumstance that in no manner affects
the degree of offence or the just rights of the accused to a deliberate
and careful trial. The logical conclusion is that it would be better
for the state that some tribunal-perhaps a court, perhaps a ruler
unrestrained by constitution or statute-should have discretionary
power to deal summarily with all breaches of order as contempts
of authority, and to punish them without the hindrance which the
necessity of associating himself with others for the trial might cause.
The expressions referred to are distinct admissions of belief that
the restraints we impose on power are worse than useless, and they
exhibit us in the aspect of abhorring unbridled authority in theory
while 'we applaud it in practice.'
I Mr. Chief Justice C.ATzR, of the District of Columbia, in the case of Kilboune,
decided not long ago that where an act constituting a legislative contempt has by
statute been made a niisdemeanor it can no longer be punished as a contempt,
since that would be to put the party twice in jeopardy. We should say that this
